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Adorno seems to set out to do the impossible. He criticises the whole of the modern 
social world, including its forms of rationality and thinking, but he does not seem to 
have an identifiable addressee for his theory, someone or some group who could be 
the agent for change. Famously, he and Horkheimer described their own work as a 
„message in a bottle‟.1 Moreover, it is neither clear what Adorno‟s standards of 
critique are, nor how he could underwrite them. Hence, his critical project seems to 
undermine itself: by subjecting everything to critique, he seems to leave himself 
without a vantage point from which his critique could be justified or acted upon.
2
  
In this chapter, I will argue that the bulk of these objections can be met. After 
unpacking the objections (section 1), I will argue that Adorno‟s theory, if understood 
correctly, contains two largely unnoticed resources for an account of normativity. 
First, I will suggest that Adorno builds his philosophy around a conception of the bad 
that suffices to undertake his critical project (section 2). It is best seen as a negativistic 
critique of modernity.
3
 Second, I will unearth Adorno‟s commitment to the normative 
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ideal of humanity, which is both compatible with and enriches his negativistic 
outlook. Adorno‟s project emerges as a normative, but explanation-driven form of 
critical theory (section 3). Finally, I will suggest that this theory also contains 
practical guidance on how not to live our lives – in short, a minimal, negativistic 
ethics (section 4).  
 
1. A brief summary of common objections  
Adorno‟s theory is a form of radical social critique in that it aims at changing not 
merely specific aspects of contemporary society, but its whole social structure (of 
which he speaks in terms of „late capitalism‟). Adorno wholeheartedly endorses 
Horkheimer‟s programmatic statement, according to which critical theory‟s objective  
 
[…] is not simply to eliminate one or other abuse, for it regards such abuses as necessarily 
connected with the entire setup of the social structure. Although it itself emerges from the 
social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention or in its objective 
significance, the better functioning of any element in the structure. On the contrary, it is 
suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as 
these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific 
presuppositions about which it can do nothing.
4
 
 
However, the project of criticising the totality of social reality seems to undermine 
itself, for Adorno‟s own diagnosis of this totality seems to leave no room for such a 
critical project. The first difficulty arises when one asks to whom critical theory is 
addressed and who would be able to act on it. If Adorno is right about the nature of 
late capitalism, then the proletariat – for Marx, the revolutionary subject capable of 
seeing through and opposing capitalism – has been integrated into society in such a 
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way as to blunt its revolutionary potential.
5
 Similarly, late capitalist society forms all 
individuals in such a way that unquestioning conformity to it has become a strong, 
internalised force, eroding the critical spirit from within. And even where protest 
movements emerge, they tend to become suppressed, diverted or blunted by various 
social mechanisms, such as being turned into fashionable trends within mass culture. 
In these circumstances, there is no identifiable addressee for critical theory, nor is it 
clear how this theory could have been formulated in the first place. Adorno admits 
that having critical abilities becomes a privilege of the lucky few who escaped full 
integration, perhaps because they grew up when capitalism had not yet permeated 
society to the extent that it did from the 1930s onwards.
6
 
 Moreover, one could object further that it is not even possible to identify the 
standards of critique with which Adorno operates. Admittedly, he often presents his 
theory as a form of immanent critique, that is, he aims to show how a theory or 
society fails to live up to its own norms.
7
 Hence, it might seem as if he does not have 
to supply his own standards of critique, but can just make use of those at work in 
contemporary society. However, Adorno denies that purely immanent critique of late 
capitalism is still possible. Those internal standards with which capitalism was at 
some stage in conflict have been either given up or reinterpreted in such a way as to 
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end this conflict.
8
 Moreover, Adorno thinks that immanent critique must be guided by 
knowledge that one brings to this endeavour independently of the norms operative in 
the theory or society one criticises. Thus, he writes in „Culture Criticism and Society‟ 
that it would be „naive‟ to think that „unflinching immersion in the object will lead to 
truth by virtue of the logic of things if only subjective knowledge of the false whole is 
kept from intruding from the outside, as it were, in the determination of the object‟. In 
Negative Dialectics he adds that it is exactly this subjective knowledge that is 
required for thought to break out of the social totality.
9
 Adorno, in fact, doubts that the 
strict division between immanent and external critique can be maintained.
10
 In sum, 
he does not rely on immanent critique alone, but brings to his critical project 
knowledge of the inhuman state of affairs that, on his view, late capitalism is.
11
  
 At the same time, Adorno also rejects the view that critique can rely on 
transcendent standards. Even if there were such standards, we could not have access 
to them, since we cannot take up „a standpoint removed by however tiny a distance 
from the circle of being‟.12 At least part of what Adorno means by this claim from 
Minima Moralia is the Hegelian thought that philosophers are children of their time 
and cannot really take up a standpoint that transcends their social and historical 
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context.
13
 Attempting to do so will only yield “abstract oughts”, that is, ineffective 
and ultimately empty normative claims about what should happen. In fact, if Adorno 
is to be believed, the problem of accessing a transcendent standard runs particularly 
deep within the social world he is addressing: whatever might be true about other 
social contexts, late capitalism has become so delusional and has affected our 
faculties so much that we cannot even imagine what a really different society would 
be like.
14
 Hence, if imagining an alternative to the actual world is a precondition of 
radical social critique, then such critique would not be available. 
Contrary to what some commentators have argued,
15
 Adorno does not even 
consider art to provide access to the good or to happiness.
 
Art merely allows us to 
hold on to the promise for happiness and the good, but it cannot fulfil this promise.
16
 
Adorno also explicitly rejects the idea of progress by way of a transcendent 
intervention,
17
 which speaks against the Messianism sometimes ascribed to him.  
 For these reasons, Adorno‟s critical theory seems to be self-effacing: it seems 
to lack the resources to account for its conditions of possibility, addressee and critical 
standards. In what follows, I will argue that these objections can be largely answered 
by showing that Adorno is a negativist. On his view, we can only know the bad (or 
part thereof), but not the good, and that this knowledge of the bad is sufficient to 
underpin his critical theory.  
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2. The resources of critical theory I: negativism 
From the very beginning negativism is deeply ingrained in Adorno‟s theory. In fact, 
he shares this outlook with Horkheimer, who in his seminal essay, „Traditional and 
Critical Theory‟, states: 
 
The goal at which the latter [critical thought] aims, namely the rational state of society, is 
grounded on the misery of the present. However, this misery does not provide the image of its 
abolition. The theory which projects such a solution onto the distress does not labor in the 
service of an existing reality, but only reveals its secret.
18
 
 
For Horkheimer, the reason why we should move beyond the current social structure 
is provided by the misery it cannot but produce. Still, this does not reveal what a just 
and free society would be like beyond avoiding the current evils. Similarly, Adorno 
repeatedly emphasises that we cannot know or even imagine what the good, 
reconciliation, utopia, or a free society would look like. For example, he writes in 
Negative Dialectics that „[i]n the right condition, as in the Jewish theologoumenon, all 
things would differ only a little from the way there are; but not the least can be 
conceived now as it would be then‟.19  
However, the absence of positive standards does not imply that Adorno gives 
up on his critical project. Instead, he proposes to criticise capitalism on the basis of 
the evils it produces, evils which – according to Adorno – are of the worst kind. For 
example, he thinks that the systematic persecution and murder of the European Jews 
was not accidental to modern capitalist society, but the result of the inhuman tendency 
inherent in it.
20
 In his view, the worst catastrophe already happened in Auschwitz,
21
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and late capitalism, by its very nature, is steering towards a repeat of such a 
catastrophe or even towards its permanent occurrence.
22
  
These claims might strike one as problematic in at least two ways. Firstly, one 
might be surprised by the seemingly moralistic and religious language used by 
Adorno and Horkheimer, especially given how influenced they were by Nietzsche. 
Secondly, one might be sceptical about the purported link between the capitalist social 
world and the Shoah. Here I can only hint at how Adorno deals with these complex 
issues.
23
 For a start, Adorno‟s (and Horkheimer‟s) talk of evil reflects the view that 
the bads we are faced with are so grave that they are beyond any relativistic 
questioning – they express objective bads and should be acknowledged as such. 
However, this does not mean that such talk is meant to cut short critical scrutiny – as 
appeals to evil often tend to do. Just the opposite: Adorno insists on our facing up to 
the problem of evil much more than has happened in the past. After Auschwitz, we 
cannot just go on doing philosophy and living our lives as before. Instead, we have to 
investigate how it could happen that social, cultural, and moral mechanisms were as 
powerless as they turned out to be, and adjust, even radically change, our lives and 
theories according to the findings.  
Moreover, Adorno‟s use of the term „Böse‟ („evil‟) is less moralistic than it 
might sound. He also uses other terms – such as Übel (which could be translated as 
„evil‟, but also as „ill‟, „malady‟ or even „trouble‟), Unheil („calamity‟, „catastrophe‟), 
and Grauen („horror‟). These terms are equally evaluatively charged, but seem to be 
referring to a state of affairs rather than to properties of persons. Crucially, the 
predicates are primarily and mainly ascribed to our social world. As Adorno writes in 
Negative Dialectics: 
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The trouble [das Übel] is not that free men do radical evil, as evil is being done beyond all 
measure conceivable to Kant; the trouble is that as yet there is no world in which […] men 
would no longer need to be evil. Evil, therefore, is the world‟s own unfreedom. Whatever evil 
is done comes from the world. Society destines the individuals to be what they are, even by 
their immanent genesis.
24
 
 
An analogy might help here: modern capitalist society is for Adorno like the Stanford 
Prison Experiment writ large, just that it is not an experiment that was intentionally 
initiated by anyone or that we could easily stop. The conditions, under which we grow 
up and live, shape us in such a way that we are capable of severely negligent 
omissions and atrocious acts. In fact, even mere decency is an achievement; living a 
right and good life (going beyond mere decency) is objectively blocked. This is one of 
the aspects of Adorno‟s famous dictum that „[w]rong life cannot be lived rightly‟.25 
This deserves further unpacking, but I will only be able to sketch two elements 
at play here.
26
 Firstly, we have to understand what Adorno means by saying that 
society „destines‟ us to behave as we do. While we take ourselves to be free and while 
many of us enjoy formal freedom (legal rights and protections), we are – according to 
Adorno – mere cogs in the capitalist production and consumption mechanisms that 
perpetuate themselves behind our backs.
27
 For the most part, we are not aware of this, 
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and even where we are, we tend to misconceive the mechanisms that govern us. For 
example, we mistakenly view market forces as equally inescapable as natural ones.  
 Secondly, Adorno holds that our destiny is determined by an economic 
structure that replicates itself for its own sake rather than for the sake of the human 
beings that maintain it, with grave consequences for the latter. Many of their material 
needs remain unmet, while they are subject to an ever increasing expansion of 
artificial needs, which also contributes to their frustration. In order to survive within 
the highly competitive social setting, individuals have to internalise a great number of 
pressures and norms, which requires a great amount of repression. As a result, 
individuals develop neuroses and other pathologies. Partly to compensate for 
repression and partly to rebel against the increasing loss of identity, they differentiate 
themselves into groups of imagined, but nonetheless powerful identities and enter into 
competition or conflict with other such groups. In the worst cases, this involves 
discharges of violence and aggression. Such acts are aided by the coldness to the fate 
of others, which the competitive social pressures generate. Moreover, the decoupling 
or even inversion of ends and means in modern society also contributes to these 
trends. Industrialisation, modern means of transportation and communication as well 
as organisational and administrative procedures become decoupled from basic human 
ends and their employment endangers the survival of individual and even the species 
as a whole. That is why for Adorno nationalism, war, racism, and even genocide are 
not accidental features of the modern world, but are engendered by the social and 
conceptual structures characteristic of it.  
At best, one can hope to develop sufficient subjective resources to resist the 
objective forces that push individuals towards participating in evils. Still, even those 
who so resist remain implicated – presumably because leading a decent life is 
insufficient in a world where evil is systematically engendered. Such a world 
constitutes what Adorno calls a „guilt context‟, in which even committing no wrong 
does not extract one from the calamities with which everyone‟s existence is inevitably 
interwoven.
28
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One might be puzzled whether talk of „evil‟ and „guilt‟ – which suggests 
individual responsibility and freedom – is still apt when it is applied to a social world 
that destines its members to behave in morally problematic ways. Adorno would 
probably answer that there is a sense in which individuals continue to bear 
responsibility. Another analogy might help here: even if we, as mere individuals, 
could not stop climate-changing production and consumption patterns, this does not 
mean that we, as a collective, could not put an end to them, albeit only by completely 
reorganising our way of life and thinking. If – as might still be true at this point in 
time – we could stop the warming of the climate, then we are collectively responsible 
for the bad effects that such warming would produce. In fact, we would be thus 
responsible, even if the bad effects are not caused by wicked intentions, but mere 
negligence on our part. The same holds for Adorno‟s views about the evils 
engendered by late capitalism: our indirect individual responsibility derives from our 
collective capacity to put an end to the problem.  
 Adorno‟s claims about the way in which modern society necessarily engenders 
evil are – without a doubt – controversial. Moreover, for Adorno there are no 
fundamental differences between the 1930s/1940s and the 1960s or, presumably, the 
early 2000s – the basic tendencies towards moral catastrophe remain in place. 
According to him, modern society and its thought forms present a grave danger from 
which one should take flight, and his evaluatively charged language owes a lot to his 
fear that many will fail to recognise this danger, almost as if they remained in a house 
despite the fact that it is on fire. Yet if one grants Adorno his claims about the nature 
of modern society and thought forms as premises, then his critical theory becomes 
both understandable and defensible. If it is true that late capitalism systematically 
produces the conditions for acts that are morally deeply problematic, then this suffices 
to legitimate its critique and the demand to overcome it. If these bads constitute moral 
rock bottom, then anything that would genuinely avoid them would be an 
improvement. Moreover, anything that would not be an improvement could be 
criticised on the basis of the very conception of the bad which Adorno and 
Horkheimer employ to object to late capitalism. In this way, the absence of positive 
standards does not detract from the legitimacy of their critical project. 
One might think that Adorno‟s negativism nevertheless implies a conception 
of the good society. In a very minimal sense, this is true, for by knowing what the 
11 
 
evils are we know what the good society should not be like. However, why should we 
think that this provides us with more than a sort of compass with which to navigate 
away from the current state of affairs? To take issue with a society that cannot but 
steer towards catastrophe does not tell us much about the features of an alternative 
society. It would be like saying that we should develop an energy source that does not 
depend on fossil fuels – this is not an empty demand, but it also radically 
underdetermines what the solution to the problems is going be. 
Admittedly, Adorno and Horkheimer state, for example, that human beings 
should no longer be governed by their own creations (be it the capitalist economic 
system or state socialism‟s vast bureaucracy); that there should be an end to human 
misery and hunger; that events like those that took place in Auschwitz should never 
be allowed to happen again; that people should be freed from the enormous pressures 
that workplaces put them under; that they should even be freed from most of the kind 
of work which capitalism requires people to undertake; and so on.
29
 Nonetheless, such 
statements should be understood as merely negating the evils of modernity and, 
indeed, of a long history of domination.
30
 As I see it, nothing in these statements 
commits Adorno to operating with a conception of the good. The key point is that – 
according to Adorno – we can identify many of the negative aspects of late capitalism 
and demand its overcoming simply on the basis of a conception of the bad.  
 Still, even granting this point, one could object to a purely negativistic strategy 
by arguing that critique should always provide a positive alternative, not just lament a 
short-coming. However, Horkheimer and Adorno would maintain that the demand for 
a detailed blueprint of a better society is impossible to meet and highly inappropriate. 
Practical solutions can hardly ever be theoretically anticipated, and we are so deeply 
governed by late capitalism that we cannot even imagine what a radically different 
society would look like. At most, what can be required of radical social critique is that 
it must be capable of guiding our actions such that we can avoid producing the 
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object(s) of criticism, or least minimise our doing so. This would be already a real 
achievement.
31
 Moreover, in their view, demands for a positive alternative are often 
just veiled demands to maintain or improve the status quo and as such beg the 
question against radical social critique that reject it as beyond reform. In sum, the 
demand for constructive criticism should be rejected, for it requires that we contribute 
to „the administration of what cannot be administered‟, to perpetuate the „monstrous 
totality‟.32  
 One further objection would be that a merely negativistic critical theory 
cannot be justified or vindicated, that its conception of the bad would require some 
independent warrant. This issue is made more difficult by the fact that, as seen, 
Adorno seems to have given up on the possibility of both transcendent and purely 
immanent critique. In the light of such difficulties, the second generation critical 
theorists (especially Habermas) have adopted Kantian, (quasi-) transcendental 
strategies of justification. For Adorno this would have been a non-starter. In fact, even 
the idea that we should provide ethical reactions to torture and suffering with 
discursive grounding is an „outrage‟ for him.33 Oppression and lack of freedom are 
„the evil whose malevolence requires as little philosophical proof as does its 
existence‟.34  
One way to support this view is to consider that it does indeed seem 
outrageous to suggest that torture is wrong mainly or solely because the maxim in 
question cannot be universalised or because the balance of utility would speak against 
it in most cases. Similarly, it would be outrageous to demand a justification for saying 
that what happened in the extermination camps was evil – implying that it could in 
principle turn out that the actions in question were not evil or that this evil would be 
merely derivative (rather than seeing these events as paradigmatic and constitutive of 
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evil). Here one feels drawn to Adorno‟s view that something goes wrong when one 
enters into a search for discursive grounds – both because it might well turn out that 
reason cannot provide such grounds but instead entangles itself in an infinite chain of 
arguments;
35
 and because it is inappropriate to ask for them.  
At the same time, if Adorno does not want to fall into irrationalism or 
dogmatism, he should be able to offer something to support his highly contentious 
claims. In fact, he himself distinguishes between grounding [Begründung] and 
vindication [Rechtfertigung], rejecting only the demand for the former.
36
 Hence, what 
vindication of his critical theory and its conception of the bad can he offer? It seems 
to me that a neglected resource is the Marxist-Aristotelian conception of humanity 
that is operative in the first generation critical theory.  
 
3. The resources of critical theory II: humanity 
Already in Horkheimer‟s seminal essay the pivotal role that a Marxist-Aristotelian 
conception of humanity plays is striking. He speaks repeatedly of the inhuman nature 
of late capitalism and laments that the current social structure prevents the 
constitution of humanity as conscious, self-determining subject.
37
 He also suggests 
that the idea of a free society is immanent in specific human capacities, namely, our 
capacity to transform nature and in our capacity to think.
38
 He seems to hold that both 
these capacities make possible human self-determination. Nonetheless, he also 
suggests that this ideal of self-determination can be grasped only negatively. He does 
not claim that we already know what human self-determination fully entails, but 
purports that we only know that the current social world prevents us from developing 
and realising our potential for self-determination. In his view, the misery of the 
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present serves as an index of the fact that this world is an obstacle to human self-
determination. 
This negativistic account of the normative ideal of humanity is even more 
present in Adorno‟s theory. Accusations of inhumanity levelled at late capitalism are 
a constant threat running through his writings, often as criticism of the way it has 
turned human beings into objects or appendages of the machine.
39
 What might be 
surprising is that Adorno builds here on elements from Kant‟s philosophy. In 
Negative Dialectics, he writes:  
 
The “principle of humanity as end in itself” is, despite all ethics of conviction, not something 
purely internal, but an instruction to realise a concept of humanity, which [–] as a social, albeit 
internalised, principle [–] has its place in every individual. Kant must have noticed the double 
meaning of the word “humanity,” as the idea of being human and as the epitome of all human 
beings.
40
 
 
According to Adorno, the gap between human beings as they are now – damaged, 
reduced to appendages of the machine, lacking real autonomy – and their potential, 
their humanity, provides the normative resources for a radical critique of late 
capitalism. Interestingly, the parallel with Kant runs deeper on this issue. Adorno 
speaks of humanity as not yet having reached Mündigkeit.
41
 This term is commonly 
translated as „maturity‟, but it indicates much more than reaching adulthood. In Kant‟s 
use of this term it refers rather to „autonomy‟, to thinking for oneself and governing 
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one‟s own life.42 The fact that Adorno uses this term suggests that he, like 
Horkheimer, endorses something similar to Kant‟s ideal of human self-determination.  
However, how can we know that there is an unrealised potential of the sort 
Adorno refers to, and how can we know what it consists in? In a revealing interchange 
with the anthropologist A. Gehlen on German radio in 1965, Adorno is confronted by 
this very question.
43
 Adorno answers as follows:  
 
Well. I do not know positively what this potential is, but I know from all sorts of findings – 
including the particular findings of the [social and human] sciences – that the processes of 
adjustment to which human beings are subjected nowadays lead in an unprecedented extent – 
[…] – to the crippling of human beings. […] And I would say that merely the psychological 
observation of all the defect human beings that one encounters – and defectiveness has 
become, I would nearly say, the norm today – this justifies the claim that the potentialities of 
humanity have been crippled and suppressed by [social] institutions to an unprecedented 
extent. 
44
 
 
Firstly, Adorno here advances the empirical claim that human beings today are 
damaged; something that he takes to be illustrated, for example, by the fact that 
neuroses are very widespread. Secondly, he expounds what might be called his 
„methodological negativism‟, that is, the view that we should start our inquiries by 
looking at forms of suffering and despair. Put differently, the negative experiences of 
people are the organon of critical theory. This methodological view is common 
among critical theorists of a variety of traditions, including some of the later members 
of the Frankfurt School (such as Honneth). However, thirdly, Adorno‟s negativism is 
not merely methodological, but runs more deeply. As he says here to Gehlen (and 
reaffirms elsewhere), we can know what is bad for humans, but we do not have 
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positive knowledge of the human potential and good.
45
 Thus, Adorno thinks we can 
maintain that human beings are crippled insofar as the realisation of their potential is 
blocked, without being able to determine what the full realisation of this potential 
would actually come down to. In this way, the ideal of humanity at play in Adorno‟s 
thinking is compatible with his negativism. This also explains why humanity and self-
determination remain fairly vague in his works: because we can have only a partial 
grasp of what they exclude, their meaning is radically underdetermined and we cannot 
fully substantiate our conceptions of them.  
Adorno‟s interchange with Gehlen also reveals how he conceives of 
vindication: if his critical theory succeeds better than rival theories to explain certain 
social phenomena and developments (such as the high incidences of paranoia and 
neurosis in late capitalism or modern anti-Semitism), then its underlying negativistic 
conception of humanity is as redeemed as it could be. This strategy relies on the claim 
that any theory, whether acknowledged or not, contains normative presuppositions, 
whose legitimacy is directly tied up with its explanatory success.
46
 This fits well with 
Adorno‟s and Horkheimer‟s conception of theory: for them, understanding and 
critique are one and the same project.
47
 In other words, Adorno rejects the nowadays 
widespread view that we first engage in purely normative theorising and then try to 
bring our results together with results of social sciences (conceived, on this view, as 
purely descriptive). Instead, he thinks we should confront normative laden theories 
with each other in order to establish which one of them is the best in terms of its 
explanatory force.   
This interpretation of how Adorno‟s theory has the advantage of removing an 
otherwise gapping discrepancy between the conception of humanity that provides the 
fundamental normative background in his theory, on the one hand, and his repeated 
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criticisms of transhistorical conceptions of human nature, on the other.
48
 On my 
interpretation, his conception of humanity first and foremost stands and falls with the 
analysis and critique of late capitalism of which it is an integral part; rather than 
deriving its legitimacy from a metaphysical or teleological account of human nature. 
It also reduces the problem of how we come to know the bad: it is not a transcendent 
standard, but it is – to come back to Horkheimer‟s formulation – „grounded on the 
misery of the present‟.49 In this sense, Adorno presents a sort of internal critique of 
late capitalism. Still, unlike immanent critiques, it does not require that there is a gap 
between a social world and the norms used to defend it – his critical standard consists 
in the objective bads generated by this world and is independent of whether or not 
these bads are recognised as such by its defenders. 
However, even assuming that Adorno‟s critical theory could be vindicated in 
this way, what practical guidance, if any, would it imply? Or, as Lukács famously 
objected, does this theory just amount to the lament of a few intellectuals lodging in 
the „Grand Hotel Abyss‟ and contemplating the end of civilisation?50 
 
4. Negativistic ethics 
In response to this objection we can return to the already mentioned radio discussion 
between Gehlen and Adorno. Here the latter states:  
 
Ethics is surely nothing else than the attempt to do justice to the obligations, with which the 
experience of this entangled world present us. Yet this obligation can equally take the form of 
adjustment and subordination, which you seem to emphasise more, as also the form, which I 
emphasise more, namely, that the attempt to take this obligation seriously consists exactly in 
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changing that which stops – in all cases – human beings within the contemporary conditions to 
live their own possibility and thus to realise the potential contained in them.
51
 
 
Passages as this one deserve to be studied closely because it is not always recognised, 
and sometimes denied, that Adorno has an ethics.
52
 Specifically, it is important to 
investigate the content of the obligation(s) to which Adorno thinks the contemporary 
social world gives rise. In line with what I argued in the previous section, Adorno 
links here the ethical demand for social change with his view of humanity: it is 
because the current social world does not allow human beings to realise their potential 
that it should be resisted and overcome. In this sense, he seems to be committed to a 
negativistic ethics – a guide to how we should live based on knowledge of the bad, 
rather than the good.  
This suggestion is confirmed if we consider other works by Adorno. Most 
importantly perhaps, he claims that a „new categorical imperative‟ commands us „to 
arrange our thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that 
nothing similar will happen‟.53 This prescription is negative and minimalist, but 
nonetheless ethical. It tells us what we have to avoid and how we ought not to live. 
Yet it does not underwrite a full-blown morality governing all aspects of our ethical 
life (as, arguably, Kant‟s categorical imperative was meant to do). It is, however, not 
an isolated element either. Rather, Adorno‟s new categorical imperative is a specific 
variant of the obligation to resist all forms of wrong life which have been seen 
through as such.
54
 Also, he offers also more particular guidance on how (not) to live 
in late capitalism. For example, Adorno warns us against being self-righteous and 
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asks us to show solidarity with those who are suffering. While his ethics does not tell 
us positively what a better alternative would be like, it meets the requirement to yield 
constraints on action with which we can condemn both the evils of late capitalism and 
those that might be committed in the name of radical social change. The negativistic 
ethics supplies us with the necessary moral compass.
55
 
However, my emphasis on the practical guidance that Adorno‟s theory offers 
should not be taken to suggest that moral philosophy alone could rescue us from our 
precarious predicament. Adorno thinks that moral philosophy can never provide the 
kind of guidance that would suffice for deciding what to do in specific situations.
56
 At 
most, it can provide a general framework (such as constraints on action), but nothing 
more. Specifically, recognising morally salient features and adjudicating between 
them is not something that can be fully codified or theory-driven. Also, the 
precariousness of our situation is not something that a theory could change: right 
living would require a fundamental social transformation, not just one in the realm of 
consciousness.  
I do not wish to suggest that, in Adorno‟s view, theorising is subordinated to 
the practical struggle for social change. To the contrary, given the absence of a 
revolutionary subject, the first task is to get a full understanding of how exactly 
society operates.
57
 Without such an understanding, practice is likely to backfire and 
reinforce or worsen the status quo, especially if it uses violent means. This is why 
Adorno opposed what he perceived as “actionism” on the students‟s part in the 
1960s.
58
 In his view, the difficult task of providing a critical theory of society 
(including a critique of its dominant thought forms) will, eventually, suggest ways in 
which social change can be attempted, but the analytic process should not be stopped 
prematurely. In fact, Adorno thinks that theorising should not be seen in contrast to 
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revolutionary practice, but as itself a form of practice. For a start, theorising involves 
the active resistance against the pressure to conform. Moreover, as our social practices 
and institutions are themselves theory-infused, a critique of the conceptual and 
ideological schemes that structure them is not just a theoretical, but also a practical 
intervention. For these reasons, Adorno considers theory to be the critical practice that 
is currently most appropriate, at least when the conditions for such theorising are 
relatively favourable, as is the case within democracies.
59
  
Adorno never gave up on radical change as the ultimate aim of his theory.
60
 
Despite his pessimism about its coming about, he emphasised repeatedly that 
capitalism harbours the real possibility for a radically different social system.
61
 In this 
regard, at least, he seemed to support the orthodox Marxist view that capitalism 
initially was progressive insofar as it exponentially expanded human productive 
capacities. Although the capitalist relations of production eventually became fetters 
on further development of these capacities,
62
 capitalism‟s achievements make radical 
social change to a free society not an unrealisable dream, but materially and 
technologically possible. Still, this possibility cannot realise itself by itself, and in the 
absence of a revolutionary subject and situation, it remains only an abstract hope – 
enough, perhaps, to keep the critical flame alight, but not by itself sufficient to 
abandon the pessimistic outlook of what lies ahead.  
This pessimism brings us back to the issue of the likely addressee for 
Adorno‟s theory and the practical guidance it implies. As far as I can make out, he 
saw no reliable mechanism at work in society that would generate the critical 
individuals required to heed his words (never mind a revolutionary class). Luck or 
accident might produce critical individuals – just as Adorno claims that his own 
critical endeavours were due to the fortunate fact of growing up in a still not fully 
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systematised capitalist world. Perhaps, the constant renewal which capitalism requires 
at some level to sustain itself will mean that some people will be allowed to think for 
themselves to a greater extent than most people are destined to do by this social 
context. Some of these might, perhaps driven by the fact that – according to Adorno – 
our material needs can be never fully integrated,
63
 come to some critical insight, and 
then pass this on to others equally fortunate. However, if at all, this will only happen 
as an accidental by-product, and, hence, is likely to be limited to a small number of 
people. Still, they might not be white males from a privileged background that are 
educated in modernist high culture – for it could turn out that others are more attuned 
to the experience of negativity and the denial of our potential as human beings. If so, 
they would turn out to be the keepers of the critical flame.  
 
Conclusion 
I started with the objection that Adorno, on the one hand, has to invoke critical 
standards to make normative claims about what should be avoided (late capitalism), 
but, on the other hand, cannot underwrite these standards. I have argued that Adorno‟s 
theory can meet this objection because his negativistic conception of humanity 
provides him with all the reasons, standards, and practical constraints that could 
justifiably be required of a radical critique of late capitalism.  
This is not to say that there are no problems remaining, particularly when it 
comes to the question of who today might be the likely addressee of Adorno‟s critical 
theory. Even if its critical standards can be vindicated, his theory either is reserved for 
only those few privileged by lucky coincidences or remains a message in a bottle for 
an unknown addressee in an unknown future.  
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